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In this paper, we give a simple proof of the fact that the optimal collective attacks against
continous-variable quantum key distribution with a Gaussian modulation are Gaussian attacks.
Our proof, which makes use of symmetry properties of the protocol in phase-space, is particularly
relevant for the finite-key analysis of the protocol, and therefore for practical applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is a cryptographic
primitive allowing two distant parties, traditionally re-
ferred to as Alice and Bob, to establish a secret key [1].
This key can later be used to secure sensitive commu-
nication thanks to one-time pad for instance. QKD has
received a lot of attention lately as it is the first appli-
cation of quantum information science which could be
developed on a large scale. For instance, metropolitan
networks are certainly compatible with present technol-
ogy, as was recently demonstrated in Vienna with the
SECOQC project [2].
Historically, QKD protocols have been using discrete
variables, meaning that Alice and Bob exchange informa-
tion encoded on a finite-dimensional Hilbert space such
as the polarization of a single photon for instance. Hence,
protocols such as BB84 [3] have been studied for a long
time and their unconditional security is today well estab-
lished [4], at least in a scenario where side-channels are
not considered [5].
More recently, it was suggested that one could encode
information on continuous variables in phase-space to
perform QKD [6]. Practical schemes requiring only co-
herent states together with an homodyne detection were
introduced by Grosshans and Grangier in 2002 (GG02),
first with direct [7] and then with reverse [8] reconcilia-
tion, and later successfully implemented [9, 10]. These
protocols were proven secure against collective attacks
[11, 12], which are optimal in the asymptotic limit [13].
Let us recall that the optimal collective attacks are Gaus-
sian attacks, meaning that the eavesdropper operation
corresponds to a Gaussian map.
The basic idea of the protocol GG02 is the following:
Alice draws two random numbers qA and pA with a Gaus-
sian probability distribution and sends the coherent state
|qA + ipA〉 to Bob. Bob chooses a random quadrature
and performs an homodyne detection for that quadra-
ture: he then obtains the classical variable y, a noisy
version of either qA or pA. He finally informs Alice of
his choice of quadrature. Alice keeps her relevant classi-
cal variable which she notes x. Repeating this operation
n times, Alice and Bob end up with two correlated vec-
tors x = (x1, · · · , xn) and y = (y1, · · · , yn) from which
they can distill a secret key by applying the usual clas-
sical post-processing composed of parameter estimation,
error reconciliation and privacy amplification. Note that
a small variation of this protocol consists in performing
an heterodyne detection on Bob’s side instead of an ho-
modyne detection [14]. The security of this variant was
investigated in [15, 16] where the optimal individual at-
tack is explicited.
Other variations of this GG02 protocol consist in re-
placing the Gaussian modulation with a discrete modu-
lation [17–22, 37], or adding a post-selection procedure
to the protocol [23–27].
One main advantage of the protocols with a Gaussian
modulation but without post-selection is that they dis-
play a high level of symmetry. In particular, a specific
symmetry of these protocols in phase-space was recently
investigated in [28] and appears to be a good approach
in order to improve the known lower bounds of the se-
cret key rate against arbitrary attacks in the finite size
regime. Remember that Ref. [13] proves that collective
attacks are optimal in the asymptotic regime thanks to a
de Finetti-type theorem which gives rather conservative
bounds when finite size effects are taken into account.
A general framework for the finite size analysis of QKD
was developped in [29] and the first numerical results ap-
pear to be rather pessimistic [30], hence giving incentive
to improve known bounds, in particular with the help
of symmetries. Partial results in this direction, such as
a de Finetti-type theorem in phase-space, were already
obtained in [31]. Whereas in [28], the authors examined
the possibility to use the specific symmetries of GG02 to
prove the security of the protocol against general attacks,
our goal here is more modest as we show that these sym-
metries allow one to easily recover known results concern-
ing the optimality of Gaussian attacks among all collec-
tive attacks. A novelty of our proof compared to previous
techniques [11, 12] is that it can be applied in the finite
size scenario.
2II. A NEW SECURITY PROOF AGAINST
COLLECTIVE ATTACKS
The main idea of our proof is to use symmetries of the
protocol to simplify the analysis of its security. In gen-
eral, the security of a usual Prepare and Measure protocol
where Alice prepares and sends quantum states to Bob
(coherent states with a Gaussian modulation in the case
of GG02) is analysed through an equivalent entangled
version of the protocol. For GG02, this entangled ver-
sion consists for Alice in preparing two-mode squeezed
vacuua, measuring one mode of these states with an het-
erodyne detection and sending the other mode to Bob
through the quantum channel [32].
The security of the entangled protocol is then anal-
ysed through the n-mode bipartite quantum state ρAB ∈
(HA ⊗HB)⊗n shared by Alice and Bob before they per-
form their measurements. Here, HA and HB refer re-
spectively to Alice and Bob’s single mode Hilbert spaces.
Unfortunately, the total Hilbert space (HA ⊗HB)⊗n is
usually too big to allow for a complete analysis.
A solution is therefore to use specific symmetries of the
protocol in order to show that only a symmetric subspace
of (HA ⊗HB)⊗n needs to be considered. Indeed, one can
show that if a QKD protocol is invariant under a certain
class of symmetries, say invariance under permutation of
the subsystems of Alice and Bob, then one can safely
assume that the quantum state ρAB displays the same
symmetry.
This might look a bit suspicious at first sight as one
may object that the eavesdropper is free to break the
symmetry of the state, hence invalidating the previous
statement. The way to solve this apparent paradox is
to recall that, without loss of generality, one can always
assume that Eve is given a purification |ψ〉ABE of ρAB.
Since the protocol is invariant under the group of sym-
metry G, Alice and Bob can consider the state ρ¯AB which
is obtained by averaging their initial state ρAB over the
group G. As far as Alice and Bob are concerned, applying
the QKD protocol (measurements, parameter estimation,
reconciliation and privacy amplification) to the state ρ¯AB
is indistinguishable from applying it to the state ρAB .
Now, because the state ρ¯AB is invariant under the action
of G, it is possible to find a purification |ψ¯〉ABE of this
state such that g|ψ¯〉ABE = |ψ¯〉ABE for all g ∈ G. This
was proven in the case of the symmetric group Sn in [4]
and in the case of locally compact groups in [33]. Then
it is shown in [33] that there exists a completely posi-
tive trace-preserving map T mapping |ψ¯〉ABE to |ψ〉ABE .
Hence, the eavesdropper has at least as much information
when her state corresponds to the symmetric purification
|ψ¯〉ABE as when her state corresponds to the (non nec-
essary symmetric) purification |ψ〉ABE . This means that
considering the state |ψ¯〉ABE is sufficient to evaluate the
security of the protocol. As a conclusion, Alice and Bob
can always assume that their bipartite state displays the
same symmetry properties as the QKD protocol.
In addition to use specific symmetries of the proto-
col, one can simplify the security analysis further by re-
stricting the eavesdropper’s action to a certain class of
attacks, for instance, collective attacks. This means that
the bipartite quantum state shared by Alice and Bob is
assumed to be independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.), that is, that there exists a probability distribu-
tion p(σAB) on HA ⊗HB such that:
ρAB =
∫
σ⊗nABp(σAB)dσAB . (1)
In the case of protocols such as BB84 which are in-
variant under permutation of Alice and Bob’s subsys-
tems, it is useless to consider symmetries of the protocol
when considering collective attacks since an i.i.d. state
is clearly invariant under permutation of its subsystems.
The converse property is not true in general. However,
the exponential version of de Finetti theorem [34] and
the post-selection technique introduced in [33] show that
it also holds asymptotically.
In the case of continuous-variable QKD protocols, one
can consider a specific symmetry in phase-space [28]
which is not strictly implied by collective attacks. The
protocol GG02 is indeed invariant under conjugate pas-
sive symplectic operations applied by Alice and Bob.
Physically, this invariance means that the protocol is
not affected when Alice processes her n modes into any
passive linear interferometer while Bob processes his n
modes into the passive linear interferometer effecting the
conjugate orthogonal transformation in phase space. To
see this, it is enough to show that the reconciliation pro-
cedure as well as the parameter estimation would perform
equally well whether or not conjugate passive symplectic
operations are applied. Let us consider first the reconcili-
ation procedure which consists in turning Alice and Bob’s
measurement results into a identical bitstrings. Such a
procedure (see Ref. [35] for a specific example) is de-
signed to work in the case where Alice’s classical data fol-
low a Gaussian modulation and the correlation between
Alice and Bob’s data are is measured by their covari-
ance. Since passive symplectic operations in phase space
correspond to orthogonal transformations for Alice and
Bob’s measurement results, neither the Gaussian modu-
lation nor the covariance of the data are affected, which
guarantees that the reconciliation procedure is transpar-
ent to such transformations. Concerning the parameter
estimation, which is used in particular to compute Eve’s
information, it is notable that for the protocol GG02,
only the covariance matrix of the state ρAB should be
estimated, and more specifically the transmission and
excess noise of the quantum channel. Both these quan-
tities are invariant under any orthogonal transformation
of the data. This means that the state ρAB can safely be
considered to be invariant under conjugate passive Gaus-
sian operations appied by Alice and Bob.
Using this symmetry together with the assumption of
collective attacks leads to a simple proof that the optimal
collective attacks are Gaussian. More precisely, if the ad-
versary is restricted to perform a collective attack, Alice
3and Bob can safely assume that this attack is Gaussian.
To show this, it is enough to prove that the state ρAB
can be considered Gaussian. Indeed, at the beginning of
the protocol, Alice prepares n two-mode squeezed states,
which is a 2n-mode Gaussian state. If the quantum state
shared by Alice and Bob at the end of the protocol is
also Gaussian, it means that the quantum channel can
be described as a Gaussian map. Our proof is based on
the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. If a bipartite 2n-modal quantum state ρAB
(for n ≥ 2) is both i.i.d. and invariant under conju-
gate passive Gaussian operations, then ρAB is a Gaussian
state.
Proof. Let us first rephrase the lemma in phase-space rep-
resentation. Any state ρAB is completely characterized
by its Wigner function Wρ(x, p, y, q) where x, p are n-
dimensional vectors corresponding to Alice’s phase-space
and y, q correspond to Bob’s phase-space. The applica-
tion of a passive Gaussian operation on Alice’s modes and
of its conjugate operation on Bob’s modes maps the state
ρ to the state ρ′. The Wigner functionWρ′(x, p, y, q) of ρ
′
is equal to Wρ(x
′, p′, y′, q′) for the change of coordinates
(x′, p′, y′, q′) = ST (x, p, y, q) and the symplectic map S
can be written as
S = S(X,Y ) ≡


X Y 0 0
−Y X 0 0
0 0 XT −Y T
0 0 Y T XT

 (2)
where the matrices X and Y are such that [36]:
XTX + Y TY = XXT + Y Y T = 1 (3)
XTY , XY T symmetric. (4)
In order to prove the lemma, we observe that if any such
map S leaves the Wigner function invariant, then W can
only depend on three parameters which are ||x||2+ ||p||2,
||y||2 + ||q||2 and x · y − p · q (a proof of this fact can be
found in Appendix A). This means that there exists a
function f : R+ × R+ × R 7→ R such that:
Wρ(x, p, y, q)
= f(||x||2 + ||p||2, ||y||2 + ||q||2, x · y − p · q). (5)
Then, since ρAB is an i.i.d. state, the same must be true
for f , meaning in particular that
f
(
n∑
i=1
x2i + p
2
i ,
n∑
i=1
y2i + q
2
i ,
n∑
i=1
xiyi − piqi
)
∝
n∏
i=1
f(x2i + p
2
i , y
2
i + q
2
i , xiyi − piqi), (6)
which is exactly the characterization of the exponential
function. Hence, f and alsoW are exponential in ||x||2+
||p||2, ||y||2 + ||q||2 and x · y − p · q, which means that
the state ρAB is a Gaussian state. This concludes our
proof.
The protocol GG02 is invariant under conjugate pas-
sive symplectic operations applied by Alice and Bob.
Hence Alice and Bob can safely assume that their state
ρAB displays the same symmetry. Restricting the analy-
sis to collective attacks, one can use Lemma 1 to conclude
that the state ρAB can be considered to be Gaussian.
Since the inital state produced by Alice, a (Gaussian)
two-mode squeezed vacuum is transformed through the
quantum channel into another Gaussian state, this means
that the action of the channel, that is of the attack, can
be safely considered to be Gaussian, which gives a simple
proof that Gaussian attacks are optimal among collective
attacks.
III. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
In this paper, we gave an alternative proof that Gaus-
sian attacks are optimal against GG02 among all collec-
tive attacks. This new proof makes use of symmetries
of the protocol in phase-space, and does not require to
consider specific properties of the entropy as in previous
proofs [11, 12]. A natural question is whether this tech-
nique can be exploited for variants of the GG02 protocol.
Let us consider first protocols with a discrete modula-
tion, such as [22]. In this case, our new proof cannot be
applied directly as protocols with a discrete modulation
are less symmetric than protocols with a Gaussian modu-
lation. Indeed, not all rotations in phase-space leave the
protocol invariant: only the orthogonal transformations
leaving the modulation unchanged, that is, transforma-
tions belonging to the symmetry group of the hypercube
are relevant in this case. This group, however, is much
smaller that the group considered here, and one cannot
conclude directly that the state ρAB can be safely con-
sidered to be Gaussian. Note that this is still true but
has to be proven with a different approach [22, 37] based
on the extremality of Gaussian states [38].
The second class of protocols one could consider is pro-
tocols with a post-selection procedure [23–27]. These
protocols have not yet be proven secure against general
collective attacks because it is not known whether Gaus-
sian attacks are optimal among collective attacks. The
technique presented in this paper cannot be used either
for protocols displaying a post-selection step as this post-
selection explicitly breaks the symmetry of the protocol
in phase-space.
In addition to its simplicity, our new proof turns out
to be particularly useful for the finite size analysis of the
security of continuous-variable QKD protocols. Indeed, a
specificity of the finite size analysis is that Alice and Bob
cannot assume to perfectly know the quantum state they
share. For continuous-variable protocols in general, this
is in fact theoretically impossible as their state belongs
to an infinite dimensional Hilbert space, and therefore
requires an infinite number of parameters to be fully de-
scribed. Fortunately, for protocols such as GG02 where
the state can safely be considered to be Gaussian, Alice
4and Bob only need to know their covariance matrix which
depends on three parameters: the modulation variance
which is chosen by Alice as well as the transmission and
the excess noise of the quantum channel. These param-
eters are estimated by revealing part of Alice and Bob’s
data. In order to proceed with this estimation, one needs
a statistical model and choosing a normal model seems
quite natural. However, previous proofs of Gaussian op-
timality presented in [11, 12] assume that the covariance
matrix is known from Alice and Bob and cannot justify
the use of a normal statistical model for its estimation.
The proof presented here, on the contrary, allows for such
a justification (see Appendix B for details).
The fact that our proof applies to finite size analysis is
crucial as our ultimate goal is clearly to assess the secu-
rity of practical implementations, which are necessary fi-
nite. A general finite-size analysis of continuous-variable
protocols will be the subject of future work.
Appendix A: Complete proof of Lemma 1
Before considering the general case of Wigner func-
tions, let us first consider the case of a probability distri-
bution p(x, y) which is invariant under orthogonal trans-
formations applied to both x and y. In other words, for
any R ∈ O(n), one has p(Rx,Ry) = p(x, y). Such a
symmetry property clearly implies that p(x, y) can only
depend on three parameters, namely ||x||, ||y|| and x · y.
With Wigner functions, the argument is more subtle, and
is detailed below.
We want to show that any functionW : Rn×Rn×Rn×
R
n → R, such that W (x, p, y, q) = W (ST (x, p, y, q)) for
any symplectic transformation S of the form given by
Eq. 2, only depends on the following three parameters:
||x||2 + ||p||2, ||y||2 + ||q||2 and x · y − p · q.
Our goal is therefore to prove the following: for any
pair of quadruples (x, p, y, q) and (x′, p′, y′, q′) such that

||x||2 + ||p||2 = ||x′||2 + ||p′||2
||y||2 + ||q||2 = ||y′||2 + ||q′||2
x · y − p · q = x′ · y′ − p′ · q′,
(A1)
one has: W (x, p, y, q) =W (x′, p′, y′, q′).
Let us introduce the following vectors:
a = x+ ip , a′ = x′ + ip′ (A2)
b = y − iq , b′ = y′ − iq′. (A3)
The condition A1 can be rewritten as:

||a||2 = ||a′||2
||b||2 = ||b′||2
Re〈a|b〉 = Re〈a′|b′〉
(A4)
where Re(x) refers to the real part of x. It is sufficient
to prove that there exists an unitary transformation U ∈
U(n) such that Ua = a′ and Ub = b′. Indeed, one can
split U into real and imaginary parts: U = X − iY ,
and it is easy to check that S(X,Y ) gives the correct
change of coordinates. Since W is invariant under this
change of coordinates, one concludes that W (x, p, y, q) =
W (x′, p′, y′, q′).
Let us introduce the following notations: A ≡ ||a||2 =
||a′||2, B ≡ ||b||2 = ||b′||2 and C ≡ Re〈a|b〉 = Re〈a′|b′〉.
Consider first the case where a and b are colinear. This
means that b = C/Aa and C = ±√AB. Using the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, |C| = |a′ · b′| ≤ ||a′|| · ||b′|| =√
AB with equality if and only if a′ and b′ are colin-
ear. This means that a′ and b′ are colinear and that
b′ = (C/A) a′. Because ||a|| = ||a′||, the reflexion U
across the mediator hyperplane of a and a′ is a unitary
transformation that maps a to a′. This reflexion also
maps b to b′. This ends the proof in the case where a
and b are colinear.
Let us now consider the general case where a and b
are not colinear. It is clear that a′ and b′ cannot be
colinear either. We take two bases (a, b, f3, · · · , fn) and
(a′, b′, f ′3, · · · , f ′n) of Cn and use the Gram-Schmidt pro-
cess to obtain two orthonormal bases B = (e1, · · · , en)
and B′ = (e′1, · · · , e′n). Note that vectors e1, e2, e′1 and e′2
are given by:
e1 =
a√
A
, e2 =
b− 〈e1|b〉e1
||b− 〈e1|b〉e1|| (A5)
e′1 =
a′√
A
, e′2 =
b′ − 〈e′1|b′〉e′1
||b′ − 〈e′1|b〉e′1||
. (A6)
Let us call U the unitary operator mapping B to B′. It is
easy to see that U maps a and b to a′ and b′, respectively.
This concludes our proof.
Appendix B: Normal statistical model
In this section, we discuss briefly the problem of pa-
rameter estimation in continuous-variable protocols with
a Gaussian modulation. This question is particularly rel-
evant when one is concerned with a finite-size analysis of
the security of the protocol (a more detailed presentation
can be found in [39, 40]).
One of the main differences between the asymptotic
and the finite-size study of a protocol lies in the parame-
ter estimation. In the former case, one typically assumes
that the quantum state ρAB is known from Alice and Bob
while in the latter case, this state needs being estimated.
For continuous-variable protocols with a Gaussian
modulation, it is known that Gaussian attacks are opti-
mal (among collective attacks) and therefore, the secret
key rate only depends on the covariance matrix of ρAB.
This means that only this covariance matrix, that is, a
finite number of parameters, needs to be estimated in
practice. Moreover, using the symmetries described in
this article, one can see that three parameters are in fact
sufficient, namely Alice’s and Bob’s variances, and their
covariance. More precisely, the covariance matrix ΓAB
of the state ρAB can be assumed to have the following
5form:
ΓAB =
(
X12n Zσz
Zσz Y 12n
)
(B1)
with σz = diag(1,−1, 1,−1, · · · , 1,−1).
Furthermore, in a Prepare and Measure implementa-
tion of the protocol, X simply corresponds to Alice’s
modulation variance, which is a priori known from Alice
and Bob. Hence, only two paramters remain to be esti-
mated in practice. Asymptotically, this is not a problem
since one can assume that the parameter estimation is
done perfectly. However, for a finite-size analysis, which
is eventually required to prove the security of a practical
scheme, it is crucial to have an upper bound on the error
in the parameter estimation. Indeed, in an adversarial
scenario such as QKD, the legitimate parties should al-
ways consider the worst covariance matrix compatible
with their data except with some small probability ǫ.
This can be easily done once a statistical model is given
for the data x = (x1, · · · , xn) and y = (y1, · · · , yn) ob-
served by Alice and Bob, respectively.
Whereas this could be done even without a model in
the case of bounded parameters such as the quantum
bit error rate for discrete-variable QKD protocols, this is
much more complicated for a priori unbounded such as
the excess noise in the GG02 protocol.
Then the demonstration given above that the state
ρAB can be considered Gaussian has a crucial conse-
quence : since the classical data x and y are obtained
by performing Gaussian measurements (either homodyne
or heterodyne detection), the joint distribution of (x,y)
corresponds to some marginal of a Gaussian Wigner func-
tion, and therefore it is also Gaussian. As a consequence,
the variables xi and yi (for i ∈ {1, · · · , n}) are related
through:
yi = αxi + zi, (B2)
where α is a constant and zi is a Gaussian random vari-
able: zi ∼ N (0, σ2) which is independent of xi. This
is the definition of a normal statistical model, where one
tries to estimate the values of α and σ2. For such a model,
one can bound the errors made in the estimation of both
α and σ2, and therefore on Y and Z (since these are sim-
ple functions of α and σ2). Finally, and this is a crucial
step in finite-key analysis, one can compute the worst key
rate compatible with the data, except with probability ǫ.
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